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FOCUSED DISCUSSION INVITED PAPER
Humans Not Instruments∗
Harry Collins†
I argue that it is serious mistake to treat instruments as having
parity with humans in the making of scientific knowledge. I try
to show why the parity view is misplaced by beginning with the
“Extended Mind” thesis which can be seen as an individualistic
version of Actor/ant Network Theory, and then move on to
instruments. The idea of parity cannot be maintained in the face
of close examination of actions as simple as doing a calculation
or accepting the reading of an instrument. The key difference is
that humans are embedded in language communities–the locus of
knowledge-making–and nothing else is.
I understand there is a movement in the social studies of science
which treats instruments as intelligent actors or participants in a social
knowledge. It would fit well with tendencies such as the very popular
“Actor/ant Network Theory” (ANT).1 ANT treats non-humans, such
as instruments, as equivalent to humans. But to treat humans and
non-humans symmetrically is to labour under a deep misunderstanding
of the way the world works. I will try to explain.2
It is impossible to understand what goes on in a laboratory unless
a clear distinction is maintained between humans and non-humans.
∗ Received 12 January 2010.
† Harry Collins is Distinguished Research Professor and Director of the Centre for the
Study of Knowledge Expertise and Science (KES) at Cardiff University. He has books
in press on tacit knowledge and on discovery in physics and a book in draft on a new
method for social science research–the Imitation Game. Much of his recent work can
be followed via www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/expertise.
1 This approach is most closely associated with Bruno Latour (2007) and Michel Callon
(1986). I refer to it as actant’ network theory since the idea of an ‘actor’ in social science
involves intention whereas the entities belonging to ANT, which draws on the metaphor
of literary criticism, are not humans but simply nodes in a network of relations. The
qualities of these nodes are just what is ascribed to them by the network and it would
be quite inappropriate to think of them as having intentions or understandings of the
kind that are taken to be the basis of interpretative sociology.
2 I have resisted this approach from the outset (Collins and Yearley 1992; Collins and
Kusch 1998 and passing references in many other publications). Certain groups of
philosophers of science have, perhaps, been encouraged to treat this tendency as a
still more dominant feature of social studies of science than it is as a result of the
central place given to Latour’s work in Ian Hacking’s widely read Social Construction of
What? (2002).
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Humans have language which supports social life and non-humans do
not. Humans argue about the output of non-humans and publish the
results while non-humans do not. Humans are the interpreters of what
non-humans do while non-humans are not the interpreters of what
humans do. Non-humans cannot be interpreters because interpretation is
a collective activity and non-humans do not have the means–language–to
engage in collective interpretation. See Collins (2010) and many items
at www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/expertise for a discussion of the role of language
in human understanding. This seems obvious. How has the mistake of
treating as equivalent humans and non-humans happened?
THE EXTENDED MIND
Rather than turning back to ANT, which has already been criticised at
length (see footnote 2), let us look at a particularly persuasive version of
the idea that humans and other entities are part of the same collective:
Andy Clark’s idea of the “extended mind” is in many ways homologous
with ANT in the way it takes humans and non-humans to work together3
(Clarke and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2002). If I can sum up the thesis briefly
without caricature, it holds that our cognitive abilities are extended by the
material world around us and that, therefore, when we do something like
a calculation with the assistance of paper and pencil, or a calculator, the
entity doing the calculation should be not be thought of as the brain or
mind but the entire ensemble of whatever is inside us and whatever is
outside us that makes a contribution to the result. Clark, who has a nice
way with words, tells us that our concept of the human should not be
bounded by skin and skull. Particularly engaging is the willingness of Clark,
in cooperation with David Chalmers, to push this idea into the body as
well as outside it. Thus, the pencil and paper, or calculator, are treated as
being on a par with those physical features of the brain that are engaged
in a calculation. In sum, if there is a physical counterpart to the “mind” that
does a calculation, it is all the bits of stuff both inside and outside the body
which fired up during the course of the action; there is no reason at all
to treat the boundary between inside and outside as anything special. In
fact, Clark wants to treat the mind as an ensemble of physical entities both
inside and outside the “skinbag” (a less felicitous choice of term).
The extended mind idea is attractive and persuasive. As can, I think,
be seen, it is an individual-based version of the ANT view of the world in
so far as they are both informed by the idea that there is no significant
3 For an earlier debate concerning the asymmetry discussed here see Collins, Clark and
Shrager (2008).
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distinction between that which is human and that which is not.4
My problem with the extended mind is similar to my problem with ANT.
While it is the case that the non-human elements in a mind-network or
a social network contribute to the functioning of the network they do not
contribute in a way which is symmetrical with the human elements. Thus,
if I say to an ANT-enthusiast, as I often do, “my computer/dog/plough is
not social” they respond along the following lines: “but look at the extent to
which the computer/dog/plough is integral to your social life. How can you
possibly understand social life without taking into account how different it
would be without your computer/dog/plough?” The answer is that I cannot
understand social life without taking into account my computer/dog/plough,
but that does not make them social beings. Thus, one might say, “look how
different your social life would be without your heart/oxygen/the sun, but
that does not make my heart/oxygen/the sun into social beings.” To be
consistent, however, that is where you have to take the logic.5
Let us try to reveal the difference between the human and non-human
contribution by jumping off from the extremely plausible extended mind.
Let us suppose I want to do the following calculation: I want to convert my
height in inches to my height in centimetres. My height is 69 inches and
there are 2.54 centimetres to the inch.6 “I” can choose to do it in at least
three ways: I can use a paper and pencil; I can use a slide-rule; and I can
use a calculator. As far as I can see, the paper and pencil, the slide rule,
and the calculator cannot make the corresponding choices. They do not,
for example, have a choice about whether to include me in the process of
calculation. This isn’t a point about free will; it is a point about what can
be substituted for what in the process of converting a height in inches to
a height in centimetres. If I don’t participate but just leave the paper and
pencil, slide-rule, and calculator to get on with it there will be no calculation
while any two of the other three can be left out.
The asymmetry does not imply that the mind does not extend itself
4 Latour believes he has developed a new ontology while my understanding is that Clark
is happy to treat his view as a heuristic–something that is an aid to uncovering new
things that might otherwise stay hidden (Andy Clark, January 2010, communication
with author). If I have understood the matter correctly, Clark’s attitude resonates with
“methodological relativism” in sociology of scientific knowledge (e.g., Collins [1985]
1992), where relativism is taken not to be a philosophical position but a methodological
approach.
5 To be fair to Latour, he is consistent on this point; for him, your heart, oxygen, and
the sun are social/non-social beings. Latour quite self-consciously “deconstructs” the
distinction between the social and the non-social thus destroying the use of the social
as something with causal efficacy. It’s a self-consistent, even elegant, position but,
unfortunately, it’s just wrong.
6 This example is taken from Collins (1990) and developed a little further in this paper.
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into these non-material objects but it does show that there is no parity
between the elements that go to make up the mind–the ensemble which
comprises the mind seems to have some non-substitutable stuff and some
substitutable stuff. It is very hard to get a grip on what the non-substitutable
stuff is but I am going to try to bring things back to ANT by taking one
further step, which, I believe, shows that the non-substitutable stuff is the
thing that has social life via its language.
CALCULATING MY HEIGHT
Suppose I choose to use the calculator to convert my height from
inches to centimetres. The answer I will get is 175.26 centimetres. But
a human being who is embedded into British social life via language
will know that this answer is wrong. If I am that person, though I know
the answer is wrong, I do not know what would be right. I only know
the right answer might be 175 cm, it might be 175.3 cm, or it might be
175.5 cm. It won’t be 175.26 because I know that it is a convention in
my society that heights are never given to that level of accuracy–people
say it does not make sense to measure height to one hundredth of a
millimetre because height varies much more than that between breaths;
part of the art of calculation is knowing what counts as an appropriate level
of approximation.7 Just what level of accuracy is conventionally accepted
when heights are given in centimetres in Britain I do not know because I
have spent almost my entire life discussing heights in inches and am not
embedded in any of those groups (such as the medical profession) which
measures heights in centimetres; that is why I do not know which of the
three approximations is counted as correct. The only way I can find out is
to embed myself in such groups and discover their conventions (or in this
case, just ask someone who is so embedded).
Now one could say that this problem is easy to solve–one just asks the
person who is embedded for the correct convention and adds some extra
keys to the calculator such as one that says “human height calculation”
with the appropriate level of approximation linked to the key via the
program. This is the solution known in artificial intelligence circles as the
provision of “scripts.” One can see why it will not work: (a) there are going
to be an awful lot of extra keys (or extra sub-routines in the case of serious
artificial intelligence; (b) there remains the problem that the human and
only the human can say what the right script is in the lived context; and (c)
the scripts are in a state of continual flux depending on how human social
life plays out and no-one can predict how human social life will play out.
That is why artificial intelligence does not work and will not work until we
7 See Kuhn (1961) for a brilliant essay relating to this point.
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find a way of embedding a computer into social life–and we have absolutely
no idea how to do it except giving an artificial intelligence a human minder.
Note the asymmetry: there is nothing that can be substituted for that
human minder because only the human minder is connected into society
and we do not have anything else that can do the job. The reason there
remains an “I”, even for the extended mind hypothesis, is that only an
“I” is connected, via language, into society and it is society that decides
what the right answer to things is. (It should be a trivial matter for the
reader to explain why modern spell-checkers make suggestions about
word corrections rather than automatically doing the corrections–except in
trivial cases. Even as simple an “artificial intelligence” as a spell-checker
needs a human minder.)8
ANT is much more ambitious than the extended mind. ANT has the
ambition to explain why “this” feature of social life is present and “that”
is absent. It tries to explain it by assembling all the forces, human and
non-human, that contribute to some state of affairs. But all the forces
you can think of conspire toward there being spell-checkers, speech
transcribers, and the like that do not need human minders–build one and
you will be richer than Croesus! ANT simply cannot explain why they are
not here with us now and ANT will never explain it because in insisting
on the symmetry of the human and non-human it misses the entire point
about the centrality of language–it misses the entire point of what it is to be
social and how unique to humans being social is. When it comes to these
things, ANT, plainly and simply, gives the wrong answers.9
8 What do I mean by a trivial case of spelling? Something like the following misspelling:
“becuase.” Damn! It’s not so trivial after all. The spell-checker corrected it automatically
first time (try it) and I had to type the middle letters again to (mis?)spell it for this note.
Even here a human minder is needed: there are no trivial cases except where live
context allows them to be trivial and live context can’t be recognised without a human
minder.
9 Some relatively promising approaches to AI research attempt to keep in touch with
social life via the flux of linguistic interaction on the internet. I doubt that these
approaches will work: we need to ask ourselves, could an anthropologist come to
understand the social life of a strange people solely by interacting with them via the
internet? In physics we know that what counts as credible can only be understood
from immersion in the oral culture, not the written culture (Collins 2004; see also the
work by Weinel on the knowledge of those who accepted Thabo Mbeki’s views on
HIV transmission which can be found at www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/expertise). Nevertheless,
whether the “internet approach” would work or not, the very attempt to make it work
acknowledges that the problem of linking into social life has to be solved if artificial
intelligences are to substitute for us humans. For ANT everything is already linked into
social life so there is no problem to be solved. That is why it goes so wrong.
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INSTRUMENTS AND INSCRIPTIONS
Let us apply the above arguments to scientific instruments. For
ANT, an instrument is taken to be an “inscription device” that gives
rise to an “immutable mobile”–data on paper or other media that can
travel around without changing–and this is what gives it its power.10 An
instrument/inscription device would have no force without the idea of
immutable mobile because if inscriptions were entirely mutable they would
be mere scribbles and an instrument that scribbles can do no persuasive
work; the immutability of inscriptions–that is, their resistance to indefinite
interpretation–is what determines the usefulness of this set of ideas. The
proper subject in the case of inscription devices and immutable mobiles is,
then, the degree of mutability (or interpretative flexibility).11 How mutable
are inscriptions?
Here again, the degree of mutability and the range of interpretation is,
to a very large extent, in the hands of the social group upon which the
inscriptions are inflicted. At the most basic level, this is likely to vary from
science to science and from phase of science to phase of science. I have
the strong impression that in the biological sciences, observation of which
formed the impetus for the first formulation of the inscription device and
immutable mobile ideas, and in the particular phase of biological science
that was being observed, there was, as a matter of fact, little mutability
and little interpretation and this is what started things off on the wrong
foot. But lack of mutability is certainly not always present in the case of the
biological sciences. My colleagues working in genomics have shown me
quotations that make it clear that results coming from other laboratories are
often ignored unless there is a personal relationship or some reassurance
based on anecdotal evidence that leads them to be taken seriously. It is not
what happens within a laboratory that matters, it is what happens between
laboratories. And, as I know from my own research, mutability is very much
not to be found at the frontiers of physical science.
Figure 1 is an example of the “inscription” produced by an early
gravitational wave detector. Now you could say, with a kind of deliberate
naı̈veté, that this inscription is the same for every scientist who sees it and,
like an intelligent actor, it simply gives you an interpretation that has to be
taken into account, but you would not be saying very much. The crucial
question is whether the inscription is just noise or something of value and
that depends not on the paper and ink but on the readers’ understanding
10These ideas were present in Laboratory Life (Latour and Woolgar 1979) even before
full-blown ANT came along.
11The term “interpretative flexibility” is taken from Collins (1981); see also Collins ([1985]
1992).
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Figure 1. An example of a trace from an early gravitational wave detector (Collins 2004,
79).
of how it was produced and how much they trust its producer; this
understanding comes before they start to work out ways of extracting
any lurking signal from the noise.12 As it happens, the state of play in
gravitational wave physics is such that it is now considered impossible for
any inscription produced before 2003–though many were produced from
the late 1960s onward–to contain a meaningful gravitational wave signal.
Indeed, Collins (2004) discusses a paper published in 1996 which contains
the inscription (or interpretation of inscriptions) represented in Figure 2.
It turns out, however, that this inscription was further “interpreted” by
default in that no-one read it (outside of the author, the journal editor,
and Collins). The 1996 paper reported results of certain early gravitational
wave detectors and, by 1996, the human-led consensus was that these
were to be counted as worth no more than scribbles–not even worthy of
criticism or even a cursory reading.
Talking about instruments as devices that produce inscriptions is, then,
a misleading way of putting things because it suggests that it is easy to
arrange for something stable and constant to travel between communities
of scientists. The real problem is how any inscription can be stable in any
12See Collins (2011) for an illustration of how a signal can be extracted from an inscription
of this kind. Collins (2011) is a book length treatment of a two-year process in the course
of which a community interpreted one particular inscription–very similar to that shown
in Figure 1–produced at one particular time on one particular day.
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Figure 2. Inscription from a paper published in 1996 (Weber and Radak 1996, 687; for
discussion see Collins 2004, 366-68).
way under the heat of varying interpretations. Nearly all the inscriptions
that I have studied have been dominated by their mutability. As soon as
they are out of the hands of their producers everyone starts doubting
their meaning or trying to establish it. But even in non-disputed subjects
inscriptions are not stable and even the relatively unqualified can question
their meaning. I remember pointing to a graph in a book about cosmic
background radiation–a subject about which I know little–and saying to
one of the scientists who was involved in the original research project,
“That line fits the data points so exactly that I don’t believe it.” The scientist
told me I was right to be suspicious. What was immutable about that chart?
To understand still more about what an inscription is, one might reflect
again on Figure 1. How did you know when you first looked at it that it was
what I said it was? What is interesting about that inscription is not the ink
on the paper but the body of institutions and your socialization into them
that led you to take it to be what I said it was without even a pause. That
has to happen even before we even get to the overwhelming mutability of
what the ink marks mean. The ink marks? They might be interesting to
a scientist well-embedded into some network of trust (or in that particular
case, more like lack of trust) but there isn’t much interesting about them to
a social scientist. There isn’t much of interest to a social scientist because
all the interpretation we have discussed is done by humans and every time
we have mentioned consensus it is formed by humans; the non-humans
are not doing any interpreting and they cannot contribute to the consensus
because they don’t have the language to do it.
THE LIFE OF INSTRUMENTS
Thus, the entire previous section has been an exhibition of the
asymmetry of humans and non-humans. Humans are everywhere–there
are disagreeing gravitational wave scientists, there is me refusing to accept
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a graph showing the output of a cosmic background detection experiment,
and there is you wondering about why you believe Figure 1 is what I say
it is. Now, of course, the inscriptions we looked at could be different, and
this might make one interpretation harder to hold than another, but even
though it is harder to cycle to work than to drive, this does not make my car
or my bike interpreters of my life, anymore than the sun is an interpreter of
my life.13
It is not logically incoherent to think of the world of non-humans as
invested with human-like qualities; religious leaders and storytellers have
done this through the ages and some of us spend a lot of time complaining
about those who treat their cars as extensions of their personality. It is also
not inconceivable that thinking of things this way might occasionally be of
heuristic value in the history and philosophy of science. I have to say that
I have never discovered this value. On the contrary, I have always found
it misleading and, where applied to fields I understand to some extent,
such as artificial intelligence and physics, positively harmful.14 In this it
contrasts markedly with the usefulness of, say, “methodological relativism”:
one gives the wrong answers, one gives the right answers. To the extent
that one wants to avoid mistakes, it is important to remember the difference
between the human and the non-human and to remember that it is only
humans who interpret what the outputs of instruments mean. Never treat
an instrument as an intelligent actor or a participant in social knowledge
unless you have a very good methodological reason for doing it–a reason
that one could and should explain clearly.
HARRY COLLINS





13For further discussion of this difficult point using the term “affordance” see Collins
(2010).
14It is also positively harmful in another area of which I have a passing acquaintance:
sports umpiring. In international tennis, line calls have been “delegated” (a word
drawn from the repertoire of ANT) to technologies such as “Hawk-Eye.” It is extremely
dangerous to do this, however, without considerable thought about the different effects
that delegation has in respect of different devices and different kinds of judgement. For
example, in the case of close line-calls in tennis Hawk-Eye has been given what we
might call “ontological authority”–the right to make truth–whereas when the call is very
close the machine’s “decision” is close to random. The entities that have to decide if this
is appropriate are humans. To set a precedent by treating Hawk-Eye as having parity
with human judgement could be a step toward a technological dystopia.
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